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THE "DISTANCE PLUS JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE"
FORMULA: A PROPOSAL FOR THE SPEEDY AND PRACTICAL
RESOLUTION OF THE EAST CHINA AND YELLOW SEAS
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL CONTROVERSY

The discovery in the broad continental shelf beneath the Yellow and
East China Seas of one of the world's most prolific petroleum deposits'
gave rise to an immediate scramble for oil rights among the adjoining
coastal nations of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.2 Although plans
were eventually initiated for cooperative development by business groups
from the three countries, 3 and although concession contracts for such
development were concluded with some seven major Western oil firms,4
mainland China's belated protest and strong counter-claim of sovereignty
over substantial portions of the disputed shelf area 5 brought negotiations

1. The initial discovery was the result of a geophysical survey conducted in late 1968

and 1969 by the Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources
in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP). The Committee's report stated that "a high probability
[exists] that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most
prolific oil reservoirs in the world ....
A second most favorable area for oil and gas is
beneath the Yellow Sea." CCOP/ECAFE, Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, 2 T=Hn. BULL., TECHNICAL ADvisoRY GRouP REPORT 39-40 (1969); see CCOP/ECAFE Report of the Sixth Session of
the Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian
Offshore Areas, 26 U.N. ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/CN.11/L.239 (1970).
2. At present, out of seventeen separately designated concession blocks, only four
remain uncontested, largely by virtue of their marginal location. See Park, Oil Under
Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asian Sea-Bed Controversy, 14 HARV. INTL L.J. 212,
219 (1973) (Map).
3. As early as July, 1970, the Japan-Taiwan Cooperation Committee suggested in a
communique that the two countries, together with Korea, join efforts to develop the
surrounding seabed. See Yomiuri Shinbun, Oct. 10 & Nov. 3, 1970, in Park, supra note 2,
at 228 nn.46 & 47 and accompanying text. At a non-governmental, inter-state meeting
held in Seoul on November 11-12, 1970, a three-party liaison committee was formed
and an agreement concluded to jointly found an ocean development corporation.
Prompting the agreement was a desire to "suspend" jurisdictional differences so that
the committee's oil groups could proceed with their plans to develop the continental
shelves. The liaison committee met again in Tokyo on December 21, 1970, when a
special committee for cooperative ocean development was formally organized and its
operational procedures stipulated in detail. See Chung-yang Jihpao, Mar. 6 & Apr. 10,
1971, quoted in Park, id. at 228 n.48 and accompanying text.
4. At least four major Japanese oil companies, as well as a large number of Western
oil firms (including Gulf, Texaco, Phillips, Royal Dutch Shell, Amoco, Oceanic Exploration, and Clinton), have concluded concession contracts with various coastal states.
See Park, supra note 2, at 223 n.33, 224 n.37, 226.
5. See Peking New China News Agency International Service in English, Dec. 3,
1970; Dec. 24, 1970; Dec. 29, 1970; Dec. 31, 1970. The original Chinese may be found in
Jen-min Jih-pao, Dec. 4, 1970; and in 13 PEKnzo REv., No. 50, at 15-16 (1970). In the
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to an impasse that has persisted, with minor exceptions, to date. In addition to China's thus far intransigent position, the general uncertainty
and inadequacy of international law and practice concerning continental
shelf boundary delimitation, as well as the complexity of the particular
geographical issues involved, have combined to prolong the dispute.
Recent studies6 of the Northeast Asian oil dispute, while amply highlighting the respective economic interests and competing geographical
claims involved, have stopped short of proposing any viable, mutually
accommodating solution. Underlying these studies, moreover, is the unquestioned assumption that the rules governing rival claims to a common
continental shelf must be based upon either the equidistance principle
recommended by Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention,7 or "the
natural prolongation of land territory" principle believed by most commentators to represent the holding of the International Court of Justice
in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.8 Application of either

principle, however, would necessitate relinquishment by Japan of virtually all of her present claims, 9 and would lead to protracted stalemate
over the factors to be considered (or not considered) in arriving at such
claims. In short, the instant controversy presents the kind of exceptional
situation which warrants, indeed requires, intensive reconsideration of
international continental shelf doctrine in an effort to derive from it
suitable alternatives for effecting a much-needed speedy and practical
settlement. It will be the purpose of this Note to undertake such reconsideration.
Accordingly, Part I will examine the pertinent provisions of the Convention on the Continental Shelf and demonstrate their inability to provide a satisfactory solution to the instant controversy. Part II will show
that the North Seas Cases, contrary to prevailing opinion, contain an interpretation of customary international law which expressly sanctions
agreement between disputant States based upon "equitable principles"

wake of the Chinese statement, the tri-state meeting scheduled for Tokyo on December
21, 1970, lost much of its impetus and resulted in little save a new Chinese protest on
December 80. See Peking New China News Agency International Service in English,
Dec. 81, 1970; for original Chinese text of release, see Jen-min Jih-pao, Dec. 31, 1970;
14 PEKIN REv., No. 1, at 12 (1971).
6. To date, there have been only two published studies of the Northeast Asian oil
controversy: Park, supra note 2; Allen & Mitchell, The Legal Status of the Continental
Shelf of the East China Sea, 51 OaG. L. R v. 789 (1972).
7. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter referred to as the Convention].
8. [1969] I.C.J. 3. See note 14 infra.

9. See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
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wherever "special circumstances" may so justify. Part III contains a proposal for just such an agreement, drawn from principles announced in
the North Sea Cases and tailored to meet the special problems presented
by the Northeast Asian oil dispute.
I
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CONTINENTAL SHELF
BOUNDARY DELIMITATION

A. THm GENEVA CONVENTION AND

THE "EQUIDISTANCE

PRINCIPLE"

While articulation of jurisdictional claims over continental shelf resources began with the Truman Proclamation, 10 no definitive statement
of international law on the subject emerged until representatives of
eighty-six nations met in Geneva at the 1958 United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea and adopted the Convention on the Continental
Shelf.'1 Article 1 of the Convention defines the shelf to refer:
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation
of the natural resources of the said areas ....

In addition, Articles 2 and 3 vest the coastal state with exclusive sovereignty over its continental shelf, but do not affect the legal status of the
waters above the shelf. Of particular pertinence to the instant dispute is
Article 6 of the Convention, which provides as follows:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or
more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line
is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured.

Translated into Conventional terms, the Northeast Asian seabed con-

10. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67, 68 (Comp. 1943-1948). The proclamation was accompanied by Exec. Order No. 9633, 3 C.F.R. 437 (Comp. 1943-1948), which vested administrative responsibility for the continental shelf in the Secretary of the Interior.
11. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 7. Three related conventions
were also concluded on the same date: Convention on the High Seas, done, April 29,
1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done, April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.IA.S.
No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done, April 29, 1958 [1966], 1 U.S.T. 138, T.IA.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285. A useful summary of the substance of these conventions is found in
Freeman, Law of the ContinentalShelf and Ocean Resources-An Overview, 3 CoaRN..
Ift'L L.J. 105, 113 n.31 (1970).
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troversy is essentially one to determine the legal status of certain offshore
islands and troughs for the purpose of computing baselines from which
to measure the territorial sea and hence the continental shelf of each of
the respective states. Application of this four-stage (i.e., from islands and
troughs to baselines to territorial sea to continental shelf) median-line
approach to the Northeast Asian situation, however, presents at least two
major difficulties: problems of "adjacency" and the problem of determining which islands are to be used in the construction of baselines.
B.

THE "ADJACENCY" PROBLEM

The concept of "adjacency," as used in Article 6 of the Convention, is
apparently derived from the stereotype of a shelf that gradually falls away
from the coast to the abyssal ocean floor.12 This stereotype bears little
relationship to the extended shelf of the East China Sea which, surrounded by claimant states, nowhere descends below the 200-meter isobath
except at the Okinawa Trough. 13 Closely allied to this concept, moreover, is the principle, generally assumed to represent the Court's holding
in the North Sea Cases, that the extent of a nation's exclusive sovereignty
over the continental shelf is to be regarded as coterminous with the extent
to which the shelf area constitutes the "natural prolongation of land territory."' 4 Significantly, it is this latter principle which China, Taiwan,
and, in part, Korea have sought to apply over the strict median-line approach vigorously espoused by Japan. 15
Under the "natural prolongation" principle, China would be entitled
to claim substantial portions of the vast continental shelf ranging 150 to
360 nautical miles eastward from its coast. In contrast, a major obstacle
to Japan's claims is the Okinawa Trough which lies east of the shelf area
and shoals northeastward from Taiwan, almost the entire length of Japan.
Reaching a depth of 1,270 fathoms, the Trough effectively terminates any

12. See Goldie, A Lexicographical Controversy-The Word "adjacent" in Article 1
of the Continental Shelf Convention, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 829 (1972).
13. See U.S. NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE, TAIWAN TO SEA OF JAPAN, CHART No. H.O.

5597 (3d ed. 1970).
14. See Park, supra note 2, at 236. See generally Friedmann, The North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases-A Critique, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 229 (1970); Ely, Seabed Boundaries: The
Effect to be Given Islets as "Special Circumstances," 6 INT'L LAW. 219 (1972); Grisel,
The Lateral Boundariesof the Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the International
Court of Justice in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases, 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 562 (1970);
Nordquist, The Legal Status of Articles 1-3 of the Continental shelf Convention According to the North Sea Cases, 1 CAuF. W. INT'L L.J. 60 (1970); and Jennings, The Limits
of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction:Some Possible Implications of the North Sea Cases
Judgment, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 819 (1969).
15. See Park, supra note 2,at 246.
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naturalprolongation of either the Japanese or the Ryuku Islands coastlines to areas beyond it.'0 Even under the median-line principle, however,
literal application of the "adjacency" concept would limit Japanese claims
to the narrow strip of seabed circumscribed by the Trough. In short, a
major disability of the Conventional approach is that, by strict adherence
to either the median-line or the "natural prolongation" principle, Japan
would be left with only the most negligible portion of its present claims.
This would indeed be unacceptable to the economic and technological
giant of Asia.

C. THE

ISLANDS PROBLEM

The second difficulty presented by application of either the equidistance principle or the "natural prolongation" principle concerns determination of which islands may be used in constructing baselines for the
measurement of continental shelf boundaries. Under Conventional methods, if a state is permitted to advance its baseline to fringe or other islands,
its jurisdiction over the shelf will likewise be extended. 17 Of singular
importance, then, is the legal status of the coastal fringe islands off China
and Japan, as well as South Korea's Dheju Do, Japan's Danjo Gunto,
Gotto Retto, and Tori Shima island groups, and the disputed Senkaku (or
Tiao-y-T'ai) Islands. Ownership, for example, of the last-named islands,
which lie approximately ninety-five miles northeast of Taiwan and lack
"stepping-stone" islands linking them with the large land masses, would
-if used as basepoints---give the owner-state vast new areas of continental
18
shelf founded on an insignificant geologic protrusion of the ocean floor.

16. See CCOP/ECAFE, supra note 1, at 35-36: The Okinawa Trough, for example, is

mich deeper and wider than its Norwegian counterpart. It does not follow the Japanese
coast closely, but leaves a fairly wide belt of continental shelf along the irregular coast
of Kyushu. The Okinawa Trough, moreover, is not simply a narrow channel, but is
highly irregular, banked on the seaward side with a chain of volcanic elevations which
constitute a bumpy ridge, cut across by grooves far exceeding 200 meters in depth at
many points, and fronted, immediately beyond, by one of the world's deepest oceanic
trenches. Park, supra note 2, at 246.
17. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 7, art. 6.
18. The Japanese position is discussed in Okuhara, The Territorial Sovereignty over
the Senkaku Island, and Problems on the Surrounding Continental Shelf, 15 JAP. ANN.
INT'L L. 97 (1971); see also Statement of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, March 8, 1972,
in J. COHEN

. H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: A DOCUMENTARY

SruDY IV (1973) (Eng. transl.); MING-PAo, No. 77, at 2-12 (May 1972); 15 PEKING REv.,
No. 19, at 18-22 (1972) (dissenting opinions in Chinese and English). An English translation of the Chinese position is presented in 13 PEKING REv., No. 50, at 15-16 (1970); 14
PEKING REv., No. 1, at 22 (1971); id. No. 2, at 15-16 (1971); id. No. 19, at 14 (1971); 15
PEKING REv., No. 1, at 12-14 (1972); id. No. 10, at 14-16 (1972); id. No. 13, at 17-18 (1972).
For English translations of the Taiwan argument, see MING-PAo, No. 75, at 2-16 (Mar.
1972); id. No. 78, at 53-64 (June 1972). An excellent discussion of the Tiao-y-T'ai dispute

in the context of international law on the acquisition of territory is found in Note, 52
B,U. 1. REv. 763 (1972).
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While such criteria as adherence to the general direction of the coast,
sufficient connection with the neighboring land domain, 19 and longstanding economic interests have been asserted on various occasions to be
determinative, 20 such criteria unfortunately require subjective judgments
not readily agreed upon by adverse parties. A baseline connecting the
islands off the coast of China, for example, should follow the general
direction of China's north-south coastline. Such a baseline would encompass an area of long-standing economic interest to the Chinese. Yet, it is
difficult to accept the conclusion that a baseline extending to an island
such as T'ung Tao, sixty-nine miles off the main Chinese coast, follows
the "general direction" of the coastline.
In sum, under Conventional approaches to shelf boundary delimitation
as currently understood and applied, neither the problem of protracted
stalemate over determination of island basepoints nor the problem of the
untenable relinquishment of Japanese claims due to adjacent troughs

appears readily susceptible of speedy and practical resolution. If the
growing energy crisis, the environmental hazards of unrestricted and
competitive exploitation, and the risk of international confrontation are

effectively to be averted, alternative approaches must quickly and appropriately be derived from international law. Contrary to prevailing interpretations, the North Sea Cases, it is submitted, provide just such an
alternative.

THE NORTH SEA CASES AND THE "EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES"
DOCTRINE

A. Tr

IssuEs

At issue before the Court in the 1969 North Sea Cases2' was Germany's

dissatisfaction, given the concave shape of its North Sea coastline, with

19. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 11,
art. 5.
20. See 1 A. SHALowIrZ, SHORE AND SEA BouNDARIES 215 (1962); Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 116 [requiring baselines to be
moderate and drawn in a reasonable manner]. One writer indicates that the Chinese
have relied upon both the Fisheries Case and the Territorial Sea Convention to justiy
their own declaration: Cheng, Communist China and the Law of the Sea, 63 A.J.
INT'L L. 47, 58 (1969), in LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 85 (S. Leung & H. Chiu eds. 1972).
21. [1969] I.C.J. 3. Although separate cases were instituted between (1) Denmark and
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rigid application of the median-line principle in determining its continental shelf lateral boundaries vis-A-vis Denmark and the Netherlands.
Against the Danish and Dutch assertion that, absent agreement or the
existence of "special circumstances," delimitation among opposite and
adjacent states is to be effected in accordance with the equidistance formula expressed in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention,2 2 Germany contended that, on the contrary, delimitation should be governed by the
principle that each coastal state is entitled to a just and equitable share.
Since application of the equidistance method would not result in a just
and equitable apportionment under the circumstances, it argued, delimitation should be settled by alternative means, based on a consideration
of all relevant factors. 23
The Court, by eleven votes to six, found that use of the equidistance
method of delimitation was not obligatory in light of the "special circumstances" involved, since its application would produce inequity by magnifying the irregularity of the coastline; one must abate the effects of an
incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result.24 In lieu of equidistance, the Court asserted, delimitation should "be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a
way as to leave as much as possible to each Party." 25 Factors to be considered in arriving at such an agreement should, according to the Court,
include (1) "the general configuration of [respective] coasts"; (2) "the
presence of special or unusual features"; (3) "the physical and geological
structure, and natural resources, of the [shelf] areas"; and (4) "the element
of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out

Germany, and (2) The Netherlands and Germany, the proceedings in the two cases were
joined and it is unnecessary to distinguish between them. For critical discussion of the

case, see note 14 supra.
22. Common Rejoinder of Denmark and the Netherlands, I North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, I.CJ. Pleadings 453, 474-503 (1968).
23. Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 13, 30-36 (1968).
Any geographical factor which diverts the course of the equidistance boundary
between the two States is such a manner as to cause the allocation of considerable areas of the continental shelf to one State.. . which is necessarily classified
as a natural continuation of the territory of a second State, then such a factor
must be regarded as a special circumstance within the meaning of Article 6,
paragraph 2 of the Convention.
Argument of Professor Jaenicke, 2 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.CJ. Pleadings
7, 50 (1968). See also Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra, at 68-69.
24. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 49-50, paras. 89-91.
25. Id. at 53-54, paras. 100-01.
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in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about between the
extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State
and the length of its coast." 26
B. THE "NATuRAL PROLONGATION" PRINCIPLE

Although the Opinion in the North Sea Cases should ideally have
proven, in the words of Judge Padilla Nervo, to be "a guide in other
similar controversies,"27 this has not been the case. Instead, the decision's
potential precedential value has been impeded by continuing legal debate over its precise meaning. Primarily responsible for this debate has
been the prevailing misconception that the case holds shelf delimitation
to be necessarily based upon the principle of the "natural prolongation of
land territory." 28 Under this principle, presumably, the coastal state has
exclusive dominion over so much of the continental shelf as may be regarded an extension of its land-mass and thus naturally appurtenant to
it.29 At least two important factors, however, demonstrate that this principle was not the ultimate holding in the North Sea Cases.
First, when read in the context of the complete opinion, it becomes
manifest that the passages which contain the "natural prolongation" principle consistently deal not with the North Sea controversy but with the
Court's elucidation of the theoretical understructure of continental shelf
doctrine in general.,3 0 Thus, the Court describes as "the most fundamental
of all the rules relating to the Continental Shelf," the rule that:
the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of Continental Shelf that

constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea
exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as
an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
the sea-bed and exploiting its natural resources.31

26. Id. While the Court also held the Article 6 equidistance method purely Conventional and hence not binding upon nonsignatory states such as Germany, the Court's
emphasis was clearly upon the reasons for the method's failure to achieve the status
of customary law. In other words, the determinative factor, according to the Court, is
not Germany's non-ratification of the Convention, since Articles I to 3 are considered
binding in any event, but the inequitable result which would be produced by application of the equidistance method.
27. Id. at 99 (separate opinion of Padilla Nervo, J.).
28. See, e.g., Park, supra note 2, at 286, and Allen & Mitchell, supra note 6; For examples of the debate, see note 14 supra.
29. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 31, para. 43; see also
Jennings, supra note 14, at 824-25.
30. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 31, para. 43. For supporting
material see id. at 22, para. 19; id. at 51, paras. 95-96.
31. Id. at 22, para. 19.
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Later in the opinion, the Truman Proclamation is cited as having been
the first to enunciate the doctrine that the coastal state has "an original,
natural, and exclusive (in short a vested) right to the Continental Shelf
off its shores." 3 2 Such passages bear little relevance to the precise issue
before the Court, but are merely preliminary steps in the Court's deductive process, establishing such fundamental notions as that of the coastal
state's intrinsic right to sovereignty over the shelf per se. At no point in
the opinion is it even hinted that the "natural prolongation" principle
supplies a means or method for determining what portion of, or even
whether, the particular continental shelf at issue may be subject to a
particular coastal state's jurisdiction.
Second, the problem before the Court was not the natural prolongation
or outer shelf limit of any one country, but the lateral delimitation of
shelf areas adjacent to several countries. The Court ultimately decided
only a narrow issue of delimitation of common shelf areas; natural prolongation was not necessary to reach its decision. How this decision was
reached, and upon what principles, however, bears utmost relevance to
resolution of the Northeast Asian controversy.
C.

THE HOLDING: AGREEMENT,

EQuiTY,

AND JOINT JURISDICTION

As noted earlier, the Court held that where "special circumstances"
necessitate (as where the equidistance method would produce an unfair
result) disputant states must settle their differences by mutual agreement
"in accordance with equitable principles" which, in light of all the relevant factors, will apportion a just and equitable share among each of the
parties.3 3 Thus, as the Court elaborates in tracing this doctrine to its
origins:
With regard to the delimitation of lateral boundaries between the Continental
Shelves of adjacent States . . . the Truman Proclamation stated that such
boundaries "shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned
in accordance with equitable principles." These two concepts, of delimitation
by mutual agreement and delimitation in accordance with equitable principles, have underlain all subsequent history of the subject.34

To the two determinative concepts of "mutual agreement" and "equitable principles" must be added one further element of the North Sea Cases
doctrine, namely, the concept of "joint jurisdiction, user, or exploitation"

32. Id. at 33, para. 47.
33. Id. at 53-54, para. 101.
34. Id. at 33, para. 47.
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for overlapping zones. Mindful that application of equitable principles
in accordance with such "special circumstances" as coastal configuration,
geophysical structures, and proportionality might lead to overlapping
areas, the Court provided that such areas must "be divided between [the
parties] ... in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally, unless
they decide on a regime of joint jurisdiction, user or exploitation for the
zones of overlap or any part of them." 85
In sum, from the North Sea Cases may be derived the sanction of international customary law for just such an alternative solution to the Northeast Asian shelf controversy, as the one which follows, combining the
principles of multilateral agreement, equity, and joint development.
III
THE DISTANCE PLUS JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE FORMULA:
A PROPOSED SOLUTION

A. TIE DIsTANcE FoRmuLA
Since the determination of basepoints and baselines, and the location
of the 200-meter isobath, within which limits the continental shelf is to
be constructed, have proven egregiously inadequate 86 and have remained
a long-standing source of contention among the four parties to the instant
dispute, it is urged that both baselines and isobath be abandoned as

methods of delimitation, and that the continental shelf be defined in
terms of simple and uniform distance from shore. The following reasons
may be cited in support of this proposal.
First, economic and technological dependence on the coastal state in

35. Id. at 53, para. 01(c)(2).

56. The most comprehensive critique of the 200-meter isobath and other definitional

aspects of the Convention is in E. BRowN, THE LEGAL REGnE oF HYDROSPACE 3 passim

(1971). See also Henkin, International Law and "the Interests": the Law of the Seabed,
63 Ai. J. INT'L L. 504 (1970); Finlay, The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Rejoinder to Professor Louis Henkin, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 42 (1970); Henkin, The Outer
Limit to the Continental Shelf: A Reply to Mr. Finlay, 64 Amr. J. INr'L L. 62 (1970).
While replacement of the baseline and isobath method of shelf delimitation by a
simple and uniform distance from shore, it is argued, would promote a speedier and
more equitable resolution of the instant controversy, this is not to suggest that adoption
of the distance method will generate automatic accord. Coastal irregularities, among
other factors, will still require negotiation and agreement. At least two features of the
distance formula, however, recommend it as a more suitable and expedient alternative.
First, complex negotiations over a multitude of subordinate issues, such as the ownership and legal status of individual islands, would be replaced by negotiation over the
single issue of a uniform distance. Second, whatever apparent inequalities might result
from application of the distance method could be readily compensated for in subsequent
negotiations over the proportionate allocation of the proceeds from joint development.
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exploitation of the shelf area now relates more to distance from its shore
than to depth of waters37 Second, the reluctance of a state to have foreign
installations near its coasts is also a function of distance from shore, not
of depth. 8s Third, a distance criterion would serve to treat coastal nations
equally regardless of geological idiosyncrasy-a principal purpose of the
Convention's exploitability clause.3 9 Fourth, it would eliminate the major
problem of troughs and trenches generated by the present "adjacency"
requirement. Fifth, the distance formula would also be generally easier
to measure than depth in seas and oceans which are still very inadequately charted. Finally, it would eliminate the problem of determining
which islands are to be used as basepoints. Since the distance formula in
itself would not solve the concomitant problem of settling disputes over
island ownership, an alternative scheme would have to be established
under which questions of ownership could be temporarily deferred without interfering with the more urgent problems of providing access to the
surrounding seabeds. At least one such scheme-the enclave approach 4 Ohas been successfully applied in recent years.
Under the enclave arrangement, effectively utilized by Saudi Arabia
and Iran in their treatment of certain disputed islands in the Persian
Gulf,41 each island is recognized as an enclave of sovereignty on the shelf.

37. Modern drilling techniques and capacities have significantly advanced in the past

decade.
Submersibles have been used in underwater oilfield operations, and offer a
potential to perform at virtually unlimited depths. It is estimated that technological capabilities for production [drilling) will be achieved within five
years to the same depths of 1,300 or 1500 feet already within the capabilities
of
Evenwill
before
the tomiddle
this decade
it is expected
core 5,000
feet long
thatexploration
the Glomardrilling.
Challenger
be able
obtain ofa seabed
in 30,000 of water...
... Technology will have reached the point at which the water depth is no
longer the determining factor. Factors of economic and political feasibility will
then play the decisive role in formulating policy for offshore exploration and

exploitation.
G. DUOmANI, ExpLorrING THE RESOURCES or TrE SEABED 89-40 (1971) (prepared for House
Comm. on For. Aff., 92d Cong., 1st Sess.).
38. For example, the United States Department of Defense, conscious of the importance of continuing naval mobility, has fervently advocated a dear, precise and narrow
jurisdictional limit in the seabed. See Gerstle, The U.N. and the Law of the Sea: Prospects for the United States Seabeds Treaty, 8 SAN DIEGo L. Rzv. 573, 581-82 (1971); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Committee
on Interiorand Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 403 (remarks of Senator C. Pell).
39. See E. Brown, supra note 36, at 7-40 ff. Goldie, The Contents of Davy Jones's
Locker-A Proposed Regime for the Seabed and Subsoil, 22 RuTG. L. REv. 1 (1967).
40. See Padura, Submarine Boundaries, 9 IN'L & ComP. L.Q. 628, 649-50 (1960);
Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
I.C.j. Pleadings 13, 70-71, para. 71.

41. 8

INT'L LEGAL MAT'L$

493-96 (1969). See Young, Equitable Solutions for Offshore

Boundaries:The 1968 Saudi Arabia-IranAgreement, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 152 (1970).
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This approach is acceptable because it avoids exaggerating the continental
shelf claim of any one state while preserving the territorial sovereignty
of each island's surrounding sea. It is significant that the enclave approach
has already been impliedly adopted by Taiwan in the reservation to
Article 6 accompanying its 1971 ratification of the Convention on the
42
Continental Shelf.
B.

OBJECTIONS AND COUNTERPROPOSALS

An alternative scheme for the treatment of islands possibly meeting the
needs of the instant dispute was initially suggested by a British delegate
to the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.4 3 Under
this scheme, which modifies earlier proposals by Italy and Iran, 44 islands
would be treated on their particular merits, so that very small islands or
sand banks on a continuous continental shelf and outside the belts of
territorial sea would not be included as legitimate base points for boundary measurement.4 5 Further support for such an approach can be found in
at least five of the more than twenty bilateral shelf treaties executed to
date.4 6 In these treaties, islands are treated primarily on the basis of their

42. Taiwan's ratification provides:
(2) that in determining the boundary of the continental shelf of the Republic of China, exposed rocks and islets shall not be taken into account.
In 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 452 (1971). Of the four states involved in the instant dispute
only Taiwan has ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf. See also E. Brown,
supra note 36, App. I, at 212-14.
43. The scheme was proposed by Commander R. H. Kennedy and was distributed to
the Geneva Conference in memorandum form. His remarks appear in 6 U.N. Conf. on
the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42, at 93 (Official Records 1958). Relevant
portions are reprinted in Ely, supra note 14, at 225-26.
44. See 6 U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.25/Rev. I
(Official Records 1958); 6 U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/
L.60 (Official Records 1958).
45. Remarks of Commander Kennedy, supra note 43. For the spectrum of differing
opinions on the treatment of islands, see, e.g., Oda, Boundary of the Continental Shelf,
12 JAy. ANN. INT'L L 264 (1968); Oda, Proposals for Revising the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 31 (1968); COMM'N ON MARINE SCIENCE,
ENGINEERING AND REsouRcEs, 3 MARINE RESOURCEs & LEGAL-POL. ARRANGEMENTS 34 (Panel
Report 1969); COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE BED OF THE SEA

18 (2d Rep't 1970).

46. Agreement Dividing the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf Between Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia, Feb. 26, 1958, in S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCEAN DEVELoPmENT 420 (1972); Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty over the Islands of Farsi
and AI-Arabiyah and the Delimitation of the Boundary Seperating the Submarine Areas
Between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Oct. 24, 1968, in S. ODA, supra, at 415; Agreement for
Settlement of the Offshore Boundary and Ownership of Islands Between Abu Dhabi and
Qatar, Mar. 20, 1969 in S. ODA, supra, at 417; Agreement Between Italy and Yugoslavia,
Jan. 21, 1970, OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
STUDY (Ser. A, No. 9, 1970), cited in Park, supra note 2, at 242 n.80; Agreement Between
Iran and Qatar, May 10, 1970, OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. Dar'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY (Ser. A, No. 25, 1970), cited in Park, supra note 2, at 242 n.81.
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size and location, so that small islands (especially those situated near coastlines) are disregarded entirely as basepoints for measurement.
While the foregoing arrangement offers the advantage of treating islands
according to their individual merits, speed and expedience would seem
to favor adoption of the enclave approach which avoids, on the one hand,
total disregard of an island's sovereignty, and on the other, the extended
delay which negotiations on particular equities would inevitably produce.
Another alternative would be to apply a modification of the Convention's median-line approach. Troughs would be disregarded 7 and baselines would be constructed first, so as to include all disputed islands as
basepoints, and second, so as to exclude each such basepoint. A medianline would be computed from each baseline and the area between the
two median-lines, representing the minimum area of disagreement, would
be a cooperative zone of joint jurisdiction. While a seemingly feasible
approach, offering greater conformity to Article 6 of the Convention than
would be possible under the distance formula, several objections to such
a scheme may be raised.
First, the "median-line-bulge" approach would create "pockets" of joint
user instead of the large, central expanse of shared seabed area which
would result from application of the distance formula. While the "pocket"
result would preserve perhaps larger segments of exclusive state sovereignty, it would likewise interrupt the exercise of such sovereignty at
irregular and probably impractical intervals, generating the prospect of
continuing conflict over precise boundary lines. The large central shared
area result would offer, in contrast, the virtues of simplicity, practicality,
and speed.
A second important objection to the "median-line-bulge" scheme concerns the character of the resource itself. Two petroleum characteristics

47. Negotiations between Britain and Norway, and between Denmark and Norway,
for example, produced agreements to disregard the Norwegian Trough. Agreement
Between Great Britain and Norway Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf, Mar. 10, 1965, 551 U.N.T.S. 213; Agreement between Denmark and Nonvay Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Dec. 8, 1965, 634 U.N.T.S. 71. In
addition, limited support for disregarding troughs is found in the United States Draft of
U.N. Convention on International Seabed Area of August 3, 1970, in 9 INL'r. LEGAL
MAT'Ls 1046, which provides in part:
Where a trench or trough deeper than 200 meters transects an area less than
200 meters in depth, a straight boundary line ... not exceeding the lesser of
one fourth of the length of that part of that trough transecting the area 200
meters in depth or 120 nautical miles, may be drawn across the trench or
trough.
Id. art. 1, para. 3.
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in particular argue strongly against designation of isolated "pockets" of
joint jurisdiction: (1) the relative impossibility of dividing or apportioning such fluid resources; and (2) their complete accessibility from virtually
any point along a given deposit's perimeter. In light of these characteristics, difficult questions would arise under the "median-line-bulge" approach, for example, how to determine ownership of oil which underlies
both "pockets" of joint jurisdiction and neighboring exclusively-controlled areas (and hence equally accessible from either location)?
In addition to the two counter-proposals discussed above, at least two
objections to the distance formula warrant brief attention. First, the argument might be made that the distance rule would engender inequality,
granting to some states rights beyond their continental shelf and to others
rights only to a portion. While the judgment in the North Sea Cases has
already responded to this argument, declaring the principle of equitable
apportionment to be the supervening rule of customary international
law, 48 a further point may be added. Whatever the original merits of
extending coastal state jurisdiction to the outer limit of an adjacent
continental shelf, the exploitability clause in Article I of the Geneva
Convention has functioned to eliminate the efficacy of any such geologically-defined limit.40 Under the exploitability clause, in its most extreme
interpretation, the seaward reach of a coastal state's jurisdiction is determined solely by that state's technological capability of exploiting the
seabed and subsoil. 0 Therefore, the Convention has exchanged inherent
geographical inequality for a more invidious system of inequalities
founded upon comparative technological sophistication. The distance
formula, in contrast, would ameliorate both forms of inequality in favor
of uniform and equal jurisdictional limits.
The second objection to the distance formula is perhaps more fundamental. In contrast to the Convention's approach, ownership of large
areas of the seabed would remain undetermined. Furthermore, it is a
reasonable assumption that the willingness of nations to relinquish the
prospect of extensive seabed sovereignty will depend in large part upon
what they are offered in return. Therefore, in place of a prolonged oil
war fought on uncertain and ambiguous legal and political turf, and at
potentially great economic, ecological, political, and territorial expense,

48. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
49. See generally note 36 supra.
50. For a discussion of the current and potential state of technology in petroleum
exploitation, see G. DUOMANI, supra note 37.
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the prospect is offered of immediate, practical and peaceful resolution

through regional joint development of undersea petroleum.
C. THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT FoPu IA
That joint or cooperative development is a feasible and proven method
of reconciling national differences in the pursuit of common objectives is
suggested by the extensive literature 5' applying the concept to such
diverse offshore enterprises as fishing, deep sea mining, conservation and
pollution control, sea-borne transportation and communications, and the

utilization of non-navigational water resources. While many such projects
have been conducted under United Nations auspices, 52 precedents like-

wise exist in such areas for bilateral and multilateral undertakings, 53 as
well as for cooperative programs entirely non-governmental in character.5 4 With respect to the problem of ownership, recent proposals have
included the vesting of title and supervisory jurisdiction in some international agency or commission, as well as the establishment of a trustee-

51. See, e.g., COMM'N ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NAnON
AND THE SEA (1969); Brown, Our Nation and the Sea: A Comment on the Proposed

Legal-Political Framework for the Development of Submarine Mineral Resources, in
IV SEA INSTrUrE PROCEEDINGS (Alexander ed. 1970); Gordon, The Economic Theory of
Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Pardo, Who Will
Control the Seabed?, 47 FOR. Apr. 123 (1968); Pardo, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?, 62
PROC. Am~. SOC'Y INT'L 1. 216 (1968) (discussing proposal for joint international ocean
resources development made to United Nations General Assembly by A. Pardo, delegate
from Malta). See also, G. DUOAIANI, supra note 37, at 51-57; and E. BROWN, supra note
36, at 114 n.88.
52. See both the analysis of the 1969 Amendments to the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, as reported in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
1 (1970), and the discussion of the "Torrey Canyon" incident in E. BROWN, supra note
86, at 130-62. Id. at 158-62. Brown discusses the 1969 Agreement for Co-operation in
Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil (The Bonn Agreement) [1969] U.K.T.S.
No. 78 (CMiND. 4205), in INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 359 (1970) and offers a particularly useful
resource for the mechanics of regional cooperation as a solution to significant oil
spillages.
58. See notes 62, 63, 68, 72-78 infra and accompanying text.
54. The 1965 Agreement Between the Japan-China Fisheries Association and the
Chinese Fisheries Association on Fishing Operations in the Yellow Sea and the East
China Sea, in 8613 SURVEY oF MAINLAND CHINA Pirss 27-29 (Eng. transl. 1966)-negotiated, concluded, and supervised by representatives of "non-governmental" fishery
associations from the two countries-is an outstanding example of such arrangement.
The 1965 Agreement provided for, among other things, salvage of fishing boats at sea,
conservation of fishing resources, demarcation of fishing zones on the high seas, exchange
of data and experts on such matters as fishing techniques, and limitation of boats and
catches. See L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEmENTs 59-68 (1969); for a discussion
of trade agreements concluded under the same non-governmental arrangement, see id.
at 69-91. See generally H. CHIu, THE PEoP'mRs REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAiW OF
TREATIEs (1972); Hsiao, Communist China's Trade Treaties and Agreements, 21 VAND.
L. REV. 631 (1968); and D. JOHNsrON, THE INTERNATONAL IAW OF FIsmRIEs 303-317,
431-442 (1965).
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ship, buffer, or intermediate zone.55 A more likely solution to the Northeast Asian controversy, however, would be some form of joint or common
ownership, 56 with cooperative exploitation of all common seabed resources and equal or proportionate division of costs and proceeds therefrom, supervised by a four-state or regional commission, acting under a
comprehensive multilateral agreement. 57 At least three factors strongly
recommend adoption of the joint-development formula.

55. The broad spectrum of such proposals, presenting the full political gamut from
nationalistic exclusivity to globalism, is suggested in SPECIAL SUBcOMM. ON THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE SENATE

COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 91st CONG.,

2D SEsS., REPORT ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 84-85 (Comm. Print 1970). The draft
conventions and proposals to date, almost by definition, have provided for some form of
international regime. The United States draft, supra note 47, has been described as
follows:
The United States Draft creates an International Seabed Area described in
article I as the common heritage of mankind, open to the use of all states ....
Revenues from exploitation of the Area are to be directed toward benefit of all
mankind and, in particular, toward developing nations[arts. 3, 5]. The character
of superadjacent waters as high seas is preserved, and contracting parties are
charged with the protection of the marine environment and human safety

[arts. 6, 8-9].
The International Seabed Area is to be comprised of all submerged lands
seaward of the 200-meter isobath. No nation is to exercise or assert exclusive
rights in such lands nor recognize such claims if asserted by any other nation
[art. 2]. An intermediate zone, the International Trusteeship Area, is carved
out of the total International Seabed Area, constituting submerged lands from
200 meters seaward to a point on the continental rise to be determined with
reference to a specified gradient feature. Within the Trusteeship Area, the
coastal state would enjoy only those preferential rights delineated by the Convention and in return would assume certain administrative responsibilities
[art. 27]. The preferential rights would include the exclusive right to grant or
deny license applications (thus effectively limiting exploitation in the Trusteeship Area to the coastal nation's nationals should the coastal state so desire)
and the right to retain a portion of fees and royalties [art. 28 (d)].
Note, Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources-Chaos or Legal Order? 58 CORNELL L.
REv. 575, 593 (1973). But see Burke, A Negative View of United Nations Ownership,
1 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 42 ff. (1968); Finlay, The Draft United Nations Convention on
the International Seabed Area-American Petroleum Institute Position, 4 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 73 (1971); J. MERo, THE MNERAL RESOUtRCS OF =H SEA 291-92 (1965).
56. "Likely" in the sense of being readily susceptible of adoption. As elsewhere, this
writer's emphasis is on flexibility, speed, and expedience.
57. While the specific details of such a cooperative undertaking would have to be
resolved by the parties themselves, provision presumably would be made for the protection of such particular state interests not only as had already vested at the time of
agreement by reason of continuing possession or otherwise, but also as to those arising
from future contracts. Moreover, large-scale investment and a favorable business climate
are likely to be prerequisites for the economic success of the development program.
See, e.g., Stevens, The Future of Our Continental Shelf and Seabeds, 4 NAT. RESOURCES
LAw. 597, 617-20 (1971). As declared one commentator:
First [business] will be concerned with the degree to which the proposed
regime offers them security against the risks involved in submarine exploration.
For example, they would require security against risks arising from an uncertain
legal regime, such as unresolved claims to an extensive Continental Shelf by a
State not a party to a deep-sea conventional arrangement; security against an
unpredictable decision-making process in any international organization which
may be established to regulate deep-sea mining; security against expropriation
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First, as may be recalled, prior to mainland China's entrance into the
instant dispute, business groups from Taiwan, Korea, and Japan had
already undertaken significant steps toward just such a program of cooperative exploitation. 58 Second, petroleum, unlike solid resources such
as coal, can generally be removed almost entirely from any point on the
perimeter of a deposit without regard to any division of the deposit made
by geopolitical references. 59 Furthermore, any unilateral exploitation is
most likely to work severe prejudice on the ability of other interested
parties to effect similar extraction, as it will disturb the equilibrium of
the deposit and thereby alter the relative concentration and exploitability
of the reserve. 60 Third, the possibility of increasing efficiency and productivity through pooled labor and technology, in addition to achieving an
immediate solution to what would otherwise amount to prolonged and
costly negotiation (with corresponding adverse effects upon the peace and
economic growth of both developed and developing nations) make it imperative that a program for regional cooperative development be established.
Since no regional or multilateral prototype is in existence, the feasibility of the joint development formula must be demonstrated by analysis
of such precedents and analogues as may be discovered in international
agreements for the cooperative exploitation of both petroleum and nonpetroleum resources.
D.

PROTOTYPES FOR REGIONAL JOINT DEVELOPMENT

Bilateral petroleum development has been approached in a number
of ways. Whereas most agreements contemplating bilateral development
stop short of equitable allocation or even coordinated exploitation,61 in

or other detrimental policies of a concession-granting State; security against

risks from hostilities in the concession area.
Secondly, they will wish to ensure that undue restrictions are not placed upon

exploration and exploitation.... For example, the regime might require the

limitation of particular States to particular areas; or might limit by area the
size of a particular State's holding; or might set a limit on the cumulative holdings of companies registered in one State; or might seek to protect the export
market of underdeveloped States producing a particular metal by limiting, say,
the annual production of that metal from submarine mines (footnotes omitted).
E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 108.
58. See note 3 supra.
59. See also 1 E. KUNz, OIL AND GAS chs.
AND GAS LAw ch. 1 (1972); 1 W. StMMgERS,
60. See also 1 R. ,MIEYERS, POOLING AND
H. Wn.Lihs & C. MEYERs, supra note 59,

1, 12 (1962); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERs, OIL
OIL AND GAs LAW ch. 1 (1954).
UNrrZATIoN, chs. 1-5, 18, 14 (2d ed. 1967); 1
at 1-135.

61. While most such agreements specifically contemplate possible common or over-

lapping offshore deposits, they nevertheless neglect to establish precise rules for co-
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an instructive minority of situations apportionment has been settled in

advance by prior agreement to share equally in any such common deposits
as may subsequently be discovered. 62 Perhaps the most notable example

to date of such cooperative agreements is that between Austria and
Czechoslovakia 6 coordinating exploitation of a common field of natural

gas in the Zwernsdorf-Vysoka frontier region between the two countries.
Demonstrative of the feasibility of joint development as an alternative
to exclusive and competing state ownership, the Czech-Austrian Agree-

ment provides for the establishment of a joint commission composed
equally of representatives of each of the contracting states.6 4 The com-

mission receives reports from a panel of petroleum geologists and experts,
and from these reports calculates the reserves in the deposits, fixes the production rate, and allocates production quotas to each state.65 The commission also approves and regulates all exploitation procedures employed by

either side.6 6 In fixing the production rate, the commission has thus far
favored Austria in a ratio of 1.4:1 on the basis, it appears, of such technical

considerations as reserves in place under each state's territory and the
relative cost/profit ratios that would otherwise obtain if the deposit were
being worked individually instead of cooperatively.67 The underlying
assumption is that coordinated exploitation will yield a greater total
return and hence greater individual shares for cooperating states. 08

ordinated development and/or equal or proportionate allocation. Typical of such
"agreements to agree" is the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Oct. 6, 1965, 595 U.N.T.S. 106,
[1965] U.K.T.S. No. 24 (CMND. 3254). For identical or similar arrangements, see the
Anglo-Nonvegian Agreement, Mar. 10, 1965, art. 4, 551 U.N.T.S. 212; the Danish-Norwegian Agreement, Dec. 8, 1966, art. 4, 634 U.N.T.S. 76; the Australian-Indonesian
Agreement, May 18, 1971, art. 7 (text in S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE OCEAN
DEvELoPmNT:

BASIC

DocumENTs

426 (1972)); and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand

Agreement, Dec. 21, 1971, art. III (text in S. ODA, supra, at 428).
62. Of this type, for example, are the 1958 Persian Gulf Agreement still in force between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, under which provision is made for equal sharing of
income derived from exploitation of common deposits-OFImE OF THE GEOGRAPHmR,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, I.B.S. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY [hereinafter cited as I.B.S.],
BAHRAIN AND SAUDI ARABIA (Ser. A., No. 12, 1970)-and the 1969 agreement between Abu
Dhabi and Qatar, which also provides for coordinated development, as well as for
periodic consultation and equal division of all costs, royalties, and fees, OFFICE oF THE
GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, I.B.S., ABU DHABI AND QATAR (Ser. A., No. 18, 1970).
63. Agreement Between Czechoslovakia and Austria Concerning the Working of Common Deposits of Natural Gas and Petroleum, Jan. 23, 1960, 495 U.N.T.S. 125 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Czech-Austrian Agreement].
64. Id. art. 2(1).
65. Id. arts. 2(1), 3(l), 4(1).
66. Id. art. 5(2).
67. The stated ratio is recorded in the Protocol of the Mixed Commission of June
23, 1960. Article 2 of the Czech-Austrian Agreement requires the Mixed Commission to
meet annually each September to reassess the volume of the reserve in place and the rate
of production allocable to each contracting state.
68. A similar example of such joint development is the Supplementary Agreement
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Whereas municipal law governing the unitization and sharing of common petroleum reserves has advanced to a particularly sophisticated
stage, 69 comparable sophistication-with the exception of certain bilateral petroleum agreements already mentioned 70-is not yet discoverable on the international level. So far as this writer is aware, in fact, there
are to date no examples of multilateral agreements in force on the subject. Further support for the feasibility of joint petroleum development,
however, may justly 71 be derived from evidences of custom and practice in
the international apportionment of such analogous resources as fisheries
and water. Both commercial fish stocks and water, like petroleum, are
fluid (mobile), yet confined to a finite space from which they can be captured. Both, moreover, are exhaustible, and hence, subject to indiscriminate exploitation to the point of critical shortage, unless regulation
ensuring fair apportionment, overall conservation, and efficient use of
the resource is implemented.
Numerous examples may be cited of cooperative exploitation of com-

to the Treaty Concerning Arrangements for Cooperation in the Ems Estuary (EmsDollard Treaty) Between The Netherlands and Germany, April 8, 1960, May 14, 1962,
509 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited as Ems-Dollard Treaty]. Pursuant to its provisions,
concessionaires of each contracting state are entitled to equal shares of the produce of
extraction, and possession gained in actual extraction by either party is made irrelevant
to determining the apportionment of the reserve. Id. art. 5(1). Regardless of disproportionate production by either party, therefore, the total volume of crude oil extracted
under the agreement is to be pooled and divided equally between them, as are the costs
of such extraction. Id. arts. 7(2) & 5(3). Concessionaires from one nation, in fact, are
permitted under the agreement to use the installations of those from the opposite nation
if such scheme aids in assuring maximum efficient production of the reserve as a whole.
Id. arts. 6(2) & (3).
69. Municipal petroleum laws of most oil-producing nations now require, as opposed
to the early phases of unregulated production, limited correlative rights and duties as
between co-developers of a common field and cooperative development of a shared pool
by all common interest-holders. Thus, most such laws expressly provide that when an
oil-bearing structure is located in two or more tracts belonging to two or more different
owners, the parties are obliged to adopt a unitized plan of development under which
competition is eliminated and cooperation is required in coordinating such problems
as number and spacing of wells topping the common source. Such plans also fix the
rate of production, total allowable production per well, and cost-sharing in the unitized
operation. IA W. Sum-AmRs, OIL AND GAS LAW chs. 2-5; 1 H. Wai.ams & C. MEYERS,
supra note 59, at chs. 2-3; 1 E. KUNZ, supra note 59, at chs. 1-6, 11, 12; J. GoonImt, U.S.
FEDERAL AND SEACOAST STATE OFFSHORE MINING LAws (1972).
70. See notes 62, 63, & 68 supra and accompanying text.
71. I use the term "justly" in the following sense: There is no developed international
law expressly governing apportionment and joint development of common petroleum
reserves; but if an international tribunal or arbitral body were to consider such question as a case of first impression, it could and probably would draw from analogous international custom and practice a rule of law requiring joint development in such
situations. At the very least, it could justifiably decide that in no event could a party
proceed unilateraly with exploitation procedures based on unrestricted capture, to the
prejudice of rival interests involved. Since international law is often a synthesis of
custom, analogy, and relevant municipal law, such determinations would be quite consistent with the normal processes of growth of the international rule of law.
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mercial fish stocks. In some instances, as in the case of the Halibut Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean 72 controlled by the United States and
Canada, or the Regulation of Meshes of Fishing Nets and Size Limits of
Fish taken in the North Sea 73 by countries bordering that fishing ground,
cooperation has been limited to the setting of uniform standards of exploitation to be observed by all commonly interested states. Such measures
effectively conserve and apportion a resource by ensuring that it will be
exploited in a uniform and regulated fashion. Other instances, however,
attest to an even greater degree of international cooperation over a common fishery aimed at the very apportionment of the resource. The RussoJapanese Convention concerning the High Seas Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific Ocean is an example of such an agreement.7 4 Under this
Convention each state proposes a maximum yearly catch of the fish stocks
concerned. The parties then proceed to negotiate the total catch and the
apportionment between them. Other agreements to similar effect are
75
numerous.
With respect to water resources, many international rivers have been
subject to co-riparian development and sharing.78 The settlement between
the United States and Canada over economic uses of the water of the
Columbia River 77 is a model agreement of this type, replacing competing
appropriation with a joint commission for governing the river's joint
development as a single unit resource. Similar international agreements,
providing for cooperative exploitation through shared riparian rights and
78
interests, are too numerous to name.

72. Convention with Canada for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea, Mar. 2, 1953, [1954] 5 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900,
222 U.N.T.S. 77. This current agreement superseded similar agreements of 1923, 1931,
and 1937; see D. JOHNSTON, supra note 54, at 270-72.
73. Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and the Size Limits
of Fish, entered into force Apr. 5, 1953, 231 U.N.T.S. 199; see D. JOHNSTON, supra note
54, at 361 n.12 and accompanying text.
74. Convention Concerning the High Seas Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific Ocean,
May 14, 1956, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1956) (unofficial transl.), was concluded as part of the
Joint Declaration Between the Soviet Union and Japan, Oct. 19, 1956, 263 U.N.T.S. 99,
116. See 0. MATHLsN & D. BEVAN, SOME INTERNATIONAL AsPrcTs oF Sovwr FIsHERIEs
35-36 (1968).

75. One such similar agreement is the 1959 Black Sea Fisheries Agreement Between the

U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, and Rumania, 377 U.N.T.S. 203. For a list of similar agreements, see
BUTLER, THE SovIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 192 nn.145 & 147 (1971); D. JOHNsrON, supra note 54, at 270-72.
76. See generally, J. COLOMBOs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA ci. VI (5th rev.
ed. 1962).
77. Treaty with Canada on the Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of
the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
78. E.g., Treaty with Canada Concerning the Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River,
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In sum, joint development must inevitably result from recognition of
(1) the physical and geologic properties of the resource itself; .(2) the
intensifying need both for alternative energy sources and for optimum
efficiency and productivity in current exploitation methods; (3) the high
expectancy of increased overlapping of individual state claims and the
concomitant need for a uniform and realistic system of rules governing
resource exploitation in a multinational setting; and (4) the necessarily
prolonged and hazardous negotiations79 preconditional to any settlement

Feb. 27, 1950, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 694, T.I.A.S. No. 2130; Treaty with Mexico Respecting
Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb.
3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 (1944), T.S. No. 944; Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers as the International Boundary, done Nov. 23, 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 7313 (in force April 18, 1972); Agreement for the
Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, 453 U.N.T.S. 51; The Indus Waters
Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 125.
79. That the entire "distance plus joint development zone" proposal will prove a
practical and feasible substitute for such prolonged negotiations assumes, of course, that
China will regard such a solution as acceptable. While predicting China's attitude toward virtually any international issue is a risk-laden business best left to sinologists, it
might briefly be suggested that at least two phenomena tend to indicate the possibility
of a favorable Chinese response. The first concerns China's Asian Boundary strategy,
which has been described as follows:
[China] has insisted in every case that the boundaries should be negotiated
anew. But while refusing to accept the legality of boundaries imposed by the
imperialists, she has in every case shown herself wiling to accept the general
alignments drawn by those imperialists. Such was the case in China's boundary
settlements with Burma, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; and in her settlements
with Mongolia and Nepal, China agreed to the boundaries that those smaller
neighbours claimed. All these governments found that her interest was not in
regaining territory but in removing what the Chinese saw as the stains of history. They found China tough but reasonable at the negotiating table and they
emerged with their boundaries confirmed on the alignments they claimed, with
minor variations upon which they had agreed with the Chinese in a pragmatic
process of give and take.
Maxwell, Simmering Dispute along the Sino-Soviet Border, The Times (London), Sept.
30, 1968, at 9, col. 5. See Ginsburgs 9- Pinkeles, The Genesis of the Territorial Issue in
the Sino-Soviet Dialogue: Substantive Dispute or Ideological Pas de Deux?, in CHINA'S
PRAanCE OF INTERNA-TONAL LAW 167-238 (J. Cohen ed. 1972); see also J. HsiurNG, Lxw
AND PoLCY IN CHiNA's FOREIGN RELATIONS 100-130 (1972), and H. Cmu, THE PEoPLE'S
REPUBLmC OF CHINA AND THE LAw OF TaEATis (1972). The second phenomenon concerns
China's accession via its United Nations seat to a more moderating, public internationalist stance heretofore absent from its relations with foreign states, the repercussions of
which might very likely be expected to carry over to, and inform the conduct of its
regionalist and private affairs, particularly insofar as such affairs affect matters of vital
world concern. Evidence of this stance, as it relates particularly to continental shelf and
seabed matters, is discoverable in the following statement before the U.N. Seabed
Committee:
All coastal countries are entitled to determine reasonably the limits of their
territorial seas and jurisdiction according to their geographical conditions,
taking into account the needs of their security and national economic interests
and having regard for the requirement that countries situated on the same seas
shall define the boundary between their territorial seas on the basis of equality
and reciprocity.
Speech by Chic-Yuan, Representative of the People's Republic of China, at the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
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of offshore rights under the present inflexible, impractical, and ambiguous
Conventional approach to continental shelf boundary delimitation.
IV
CONCLUSION

The complexities of the East China and Yellow Seas continental shelf
oil controversy serve to highlight the full spectrum of inadequacies inherent in Conventional approaches to shelf boundary delimitation. Application of the equidistance method recommended by Article 6 of the
Geneva Convention, for example, would effectively eliminate the major
portion of Japanese claims in the area, while operating to further prolong
negotiations over such difficult issues as island ownership and the determination of island basepoints. In holding that where "special circumstances" justify, as where the equidistance rule would produce an unfair
result, customary international law requires that parties must effect a
mutual agreement in accordance with "equitable principles," the Court
of Justice in the North Sea Cases, contrary to prevailing opinion offered a
viable alternative to present methods of resolving shelf boundary disputes.
Under the North Sea Cases doctrine, and within the context of customary
international law, the following solution is urged: (1) that baselines, 200meter isobath and the exploitability rule be abandoned, and that the territorial sea and shelf be determined by a simple and uniform distance
from shore; (2) that islands be treated as enclaves, unrelated to boundary
delimitation; and (3) that the remaining undelimited, common, or overlapping areas be declared a regional zone subject to joint jurisdiction and
development. Strongly recommended by the geological properties of the
resource itself, by recognition that three of the claimant states had already begun efforts toward such cooperative resolution, and by the advantages of maximized efficiency and productivity to be derived from
pooled labor and technology, the "distance plus joint development zone"

of National Jurisdiction, Mar. 3, 1972, in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 654, 660 (1972). It
might also be added that even should a joint development program on a formal, governmental level prove unpalatable to the Chinese, numerous precedents in China's relations
with non-recognized and non-recognizing states indicate its willingness to condone such
practical arrangements on a quasi- or non-governmental level. Although Japan's recent
diplomatic recognition of mainland China will doubtless alter the pattern of such arrangements as between China and Japan, the various agreements concluded between
private associations from the two countries still furnish a workable model for any
larger-scale non-governmental accord. See note 59 supra.
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formula offers perhaps the only feasible means toward the speedy and
practical resolution of the instant controversy. Finally, while no regional
or multilateral prototypes exist to date, ample support for the feasibility
of joint development is discoverable in long-standing international agreements for the cooperative exploitation of both petroleum and non-petroleum resources.
In sum, the Northeast Asian oil controversy represents a new stage of
needs in an evolving law of the sea and of the sea's resources that demands,
not narrow computational solutions based on anachronistic and untenable geophysical, technological, and jurisdictional premises, but macropolitical and macrogeographical solutions consistent with the realities
of a world grown suddenly small.
Leonard B. Terr

